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COMMENTS
Regulation of Fundamentalist
Christian Schools: Free Exercise of
Religion v. The State's Interest in
Quality Education
INTRODUCTION
"In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education."' The truth of this observation, made a
quarter of a century ago by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education, remains obvious today. But the recent
emergence of fundamentalist Christian schools which oppose
all forms of state regulation has severely threatened the ability
of a state to guarantee to all its children the opportunity for a
quality education. One report has estimated that, as a reaction
to integration and because of a disdain for the "secular, hu-
manistic values" being taught in the public schools, some 5,000
fundamentalist schools have "sprung up in the past few
years."
2
The fundamentalists' legal argument against state regula-
tion is based primarily upon the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, applicable to states through the fourteenth.3
Challenges to state regulation have met mixed results in the
courts; courts in Ohio and Kentucky, for example, have ruled
in favor of the schools, while a North Carolina court has ruled
against them.'
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
I The Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 4, 1979, § G, at 7, col. 1.
The first amendment's religion clauses prevent Congress from passing a law
"respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. AMEND. I. Both prohibitions apply to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise clause).
Hinton v. Ky. St. Bd. of Educ., No. 88314 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Div. I, Oct. 4, 1978),
appeal docketed sub nom. Ky. St. Bd. for Secondary and Elementary Educ. v. Ruda-
sill, No. 78-SC-642-T (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hinton]; State
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The Kentucky case, Hinton v. Kentucky State Board of
Education, 5 is particularly worthy of note for two reasons. First,
it is the most wide-sweeping victory to date for the fundamen-
talist schools.6 The Kentucky State Board of Education (now
the Kentucky State Board For Secondary and Elementary
Education) had attempted to force the plaintiff schools to com-
ply with textbook approval requirements, teacher certification
requirements, curriculum requirements, and certain other min-
imum standards for accreditation.7 The court ruled that the
imposition of each of these violated the free exercise clause.
8
v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78-C.V.S. 1678 (Wake Co. Superior Cir. Ct.,
Sept. 1, 1978). See The Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 4, 1979, § G, at 7, col. 1.
' The plaintiffs here were "36 individuals [pastors and parents], five Christian
schools, and one association of [18] Christian schools." Hinton, Brief for Defendants
at 3. The suit was brought specifically to obtain an order enjoining the state from
enforcing its compulsory attendance law that requires parents to send children ages 7-
16 to an accredited school, and, indirectly, to prevent the state from enforcing its
accreditation requirements against these religious schools.
The Kentucky court invalidated all regulation of the teaching performed in these
schools. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text infra for a brief summary of the court's
holding. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976),
did not go as far. See Note, Constitutional Law-Public Regulation of Private Reli-
gious Schools, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 899, 925.(1976).
7 This Comment will deal only with the teacher, textbook, and curriculum re-
quirements.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 156.445 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRSJ provides that "[n]o
textbook shall be used in any public school in Kentucky as a basal text unless it has
been approved and listed on the state multiple list of textbooks by the state textbook
commission." (emphasis added). State education officials have interpreted this as
applying to private schools as well. Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 50, at 7; Brief for
Plaintiffs at 26-27; Brief for Defendants at 14-15. If a school wishes to use a basal text
not on the "list" it must obtain approval from the state. Hinton, Findings of Fact, Nos.
57, 61, at 8-9; Brief for Plaintiffs at 27; Brief for Defendants at 14-15.
While all schools are required to use only teachers certified by the state, the only
requirement for certification to teach in a private school is a Bachelor's degree from
an accredited college or university. KRS § 161.030 (1) (1970).
The plaintiffs also specifically objected to curriculum guidelines adopted pursuant
to KRS § 156.160(2) (Supp. 1978) as well as several of the standards contained in
Standards for Accrediting Kentucky Schools, 704 Ky. AD. REG. § 10.022 (1978). Brief
for Plaintiffs at 29-36. The state has admitted that some of the standards are vague.
Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 54, at 7.
3 Hinton, Conclusion of Law No. 1, at 11-12. The court also ruled that the regula-
tions violated the first amendment's establishment clause and section 5 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution. Hinton, Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 3, at 12. Only the free exercise
issue will be discussed at length in this Comment.
For a law to withstand an attack under the establishment clause, it must have a
secular purpose, a principal effect neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, and no
excessive entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz
1978-79] CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS REGULATION
Second, the Hinton court's approach to the problems of
free exercise of religion and quality education was unique: by
holding that the schools' use of standardized tests was suffi-
cient protection for the state's interest in the education of its
children,' the court only paid lip service to the need for quality
education. This Comment will analyze the free exercise claim
advanced in Hinton and examine the desirability of using uni-
form test scores as the sole measure of a school's performance.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAIM"
In analyzing any free exercise claim, the courts must be
v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1969). The gist of the claim in Hinton was that the
regulations represent an excessive entanglement.
While the Supreme Court has never struck down a law under the establishment
clause where there was regulation of instead of aid to, religion, such a claim could be
justified under at least two theories. First, regulation could be characterized as an
establishment of non-religion; second, the establishment clause could arguably man-
date total separation of church and state, with the key word being "respecting" an
establishment of religion. For a seventh circuit case striking down a regulation under
the establishment clause, though without a detailed explanation, see Catholic Bishop
of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
In neither Lemon nor Walz did the Supreme Court adopt a balancing approach
to the establishment clause claim. An implication of this is that a regulation which
involves "excessive entanglement" will not be saved by a showing of a compelling state
interest. The court in Hinton seemed confused on this point, saying, "Any such entan-
glement in religious matters, absent a compelling State interest, is forbidden." Hinton
at 3. Perhaps that confusion explains the court's readiness to find an excessive entan-
glement.
The Kentucky constitutional claim involves substantially the same issues as the
first amendment claims. Hinton, Brief for Plaintiffs at 57. One clause of the Kentucky
Constitution, however, is particularly important: "[N]or shall any man be compelled
to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed." Ky.
CONST. § 5. Since this clause was written when education for every child was not as
vital as it is today, the Kentucky courts should interpret it as being conditional,
requiring a balancing of interests, rather than absolute. If they cannot in good consci-
ence do so, the clause should be repealed. (Many other parts of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion are out of step with modem reality. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. § 187, which provides
for "separate schools for white and colored children.").
The significance of the § 5 claim is that it may keep Hinton from reaching the
United States Supreme Court. If the Kentucky Supreme Court rules for the fundamen-
talist schools on the issue, the case will not be reviewable because of the "adequate
and independent state grounds" doctrine. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126
(1945).
' Hinton at 2.
' For an excellent discussion of the history and current status of the free exercise
clause, see Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 6 J.L. AND EDUC. 449 (1977). See also
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217.
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careful not to "overprotect" religion. Such overprotection
might be equivalent to establishing religion, a practice that is
forbidden by the first amendment." The two religion clauses
are, thus, to a degree, inconsistent. As the Court noted in Walz
v. Tax Commission,2 "[I1f expanded to a logical extreme,
[either] would tend to clash with the other." 3 Thus, in deter-
mining the interference with a fundamentalist Christian
school's free exercise, courts must examine the burdens on reli-
gion carefully, and not carry the free exercise clause to such
extremes as to infringe upon the establishment clause.
In making their free exercise claim, the fundamentalist
schools rely heavily upon the landmark case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder." There, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Wis-
consin's compulsory education law as it was applied to Amish
children who were beyond the eighth grade. The burden on the
free exercise of the Amish, a strict religious sect, was severe;
the eventual destruction of their sect was likely if they were not
exempted. 5 On the other hand, the state's interest in one or
two years of education beyond the eighth grade was not great,
particularly since Amish teenagers were getting practical expe-
rience in farming and the Amish people had always been self-
supporting."
The Yoder Court applied a three-pronged balancing test,
which had been established in Sherbert v. Verner, 17 and held
that this minimal state interest did not justify such a severe
burden on the Amish people. 8 This balancing test, the relevant
" See note 8 supra for a brief discussion of the establishment clause claim.
12 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
13 Id. at 668-69. For example, a prohibition of all governmental aid to religious
schools on establishment clause grounds would likely force many of them to close, thus
burdening their free exercise. Likewise, a wholesale granting of exemptions from gen-
eral laws because of a religion's claim of free exercise would, to a degree, be an estab-
lishment of that religion.
1' 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Hinton and Yoder have more in common than legal theo-
ries. The religious claimants were represented by the same attorney, William B. Ball,
and used the same expert witness, Dr. Donald Erickson.
"Id. at 219.
, In fact, the Amish convinced the Court that the incremental year or two of
formal education "in place of their long-establised program of informal vocational
education would do little to serve [the state's] interest." Id. at 222.
17 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Is 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972). Yoder prompted immediate comment in a number of
law journals. See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Religion and Compulsory Education, 26 ARK.
L. REV. 555 (1973); Note, Wisconsin v. Yoder: The Right to be Different - First
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test in any free exercise case, has been stated simply:
[I]f the individual demonstrates that his actions are sin-
cerely religious and have been interfered with as a result of a
state regulation, the state must demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest in the regulation, an interest which could
not be promoted by any less restrictive means."
Another analysis would weigh a free exercise claim accord-
ing to two factors: "first, the sincerity and importance of the
religious practice for which special protection is claimed; and
second, the degree to which the governmental regulation inter-
feres with that practice."2 While the Supreme Court has never
expressly accepted such an approach, a weighing of the import-
ance of the religious practice and the degree of the burden is
implicit in any balancing of interests. Language from Yoder
bears this out:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from
a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may
run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger can-
not be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital
Amendment Exemption for Amish under the Free Exercise Clause, 22 DEPAuL L. Rsv.
539 (1972); Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law - Free Exercise of Religion, 11 DuQ.
L. REv. 433 (1973); Note, The Amish Prevail Over Compulsory Education Laws: Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 26 Sw. L.J. 912 (1972).
Yoder illustrates the continued change in the application of the free exercise
clause. Only six years before Yoder, a nearly identical claim was involved in a case to
which the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See State v. Garber, 419 P.2d 896 (Kan.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967). For an analysis of Garber, see Casad,
Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on
State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. Rav. 423 (1968).
" Marcus, supra note 10, at 1242. Marcus' statement of the SherbertlYoder test
is the most succinct found by this author. In Yoder, the state agreed that the Amish
beliefs were sincerely religious. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). The Court
went on to say:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond
the eighth grade. . . it must appear either that the State does not deny the
free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 214. The "less restrictive means" part of the test comes from the Yoder Court's
statement that "only those interests ... not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215.
" Giannella, Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 1381, 1390 (1967)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of this proposed test, see Clark, Guideliies for the
Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 327, 329-344 (1969).
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it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right
of free exercise.
21
The negative implication of this is that the "danger" of violat-
ing the establishment clause could prevent an exception which
is not "vital," meaning, of course, where there is no real need
for protection of the values or practices being burdened by
regulation. For this reason, the Court in Yoder went to great
lengths to point out that compulsory school attendance beyond
the eighth grade would not merely offend the Amish "sub-
jective" tenets, but would also pose "a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice as
they exist today." Certainly, this high degree of interference
with a very important practice justified an "exception from the
general obligation of citizenship" and outweighed the poten-
tial establishment clause claim. It is imperative that the fun-
damentalist Christian schools' alleged burden be analyzed in
light of these considerations.
While courts have occasionally ruled in favor of state regu-
lation on the ground that the belief underlying the burdened
action was not a sincere, religious one,u the state in Hinton did
not dispute the sincerity or religious nature of the plaintiffs'
beliefs.u Rather, it concentrated on the other two prongs of the
test, the interference with free exercise and the state's interest
in the regulation.
A. Interference With Free Exercise
If interference with religion can be found, the state must
not only have a compelling interest to justify interference, it
must also promote that interest by the least restrictive means.
Simplified, the alleged interference in Hinton can be viewed at
two levels: first, that the parents' right to guide their children
21 406 U.S. at 220-21.
n Id. at 218.
2 Id. at 221.
u See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian Schools Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1235 (1978) (racial segregation is not a religious belief); McCart-
ney v. Austin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (required polio vaccine not in violation
of religious belief of a Catholic). For a criticism of Brown see Note, A Sectarian School
Asserts Its Religious Beliefs: Have the Courts Narrowed the Constitutional Right to
Free Exercise of Religion?, 32 U. MIum L. REv. 709 (1978).
2 Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 5-6.
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intellectually and religiously, an important right which has
been protected by a long line of cases,26 had been burdened;
second, that their right to do this without any governmental
regulation had been absolutely denied.
In arguing against any governmental regulation, the plain-
tiffs claimed that their schools were an arm of their religious
mission, that they believed in total separation of church and
state, and that regulation of their teaching made them choose
between following their religious tenets or complying with the
regulation.Y Thus, any regulation was a burden on their free
exercise, requiring a showing of a compelling state interest.2s
The school's submission to health, fire, and safety standards
would seem to be inconsistent with such a claim. The plaintiffs
distinguished this type of regulation from the opposed regula-
tions: the health, fire, and safety standards were not directly
related to their teaching mission .2 The state forcefully ad-
vanced what the court termed, "[a] worldly view that reli-
gious education is severable from secular,"3 and that the secu-
lar function of these schools authorized state regulation.3' This
separation argument was soundly rejected,3 2 as it has been in
several cases dealing with aid to religious schools.3
N See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1927).
2 Hinton, Brief for Plaintiffs at 21-22.
9 Hinton, Brief for Plaintiffs at 21-22; Hinton, Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 11, 12,
80, at 1, 2, 11.
n Hinton, Closing Arguments at 28-29 (Ball for Plaintiff). The court explained the
Plaintiffs' compliance with these standards in a different manner: "Plaintiffs here
admit-judicially-the State's overriding interest in maintaining reasonable health,
fire and safety standards for all schools." Hinton at 2.
Hinton at 2.
' Hinton, Closing Arguments at 41-42 (Combs for Defendant).
n Hinton at 2-3; Findings of Fact No. 16, at 3.
" See, e.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975), where the Court said,
"lit would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions
from the predominantly religious role performed by many ...church-related
schools." See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 634-35 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring):
It is well known that everything taught in most parochial schools is taught
with the ultimate goal of religious education in mind. Rev. Joseph H. Fi-
chter, S.J., stated in Parochial School: A Sociological Study 86 (1958):
".... . Even arithmetic can be used as an instrument of pious thoughts,
as in the case of the teacher who gave this problem to her class: 'If it takes
forty thousand priests and a hundred and forty thousand sisters to care for
forty million Catholics in the United States, how many more priests and
1978-79]
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While it is unclear in Hinton how much consideration was
given to this argument against any regulation, courts faced
with such arguments must exercise the utmost caution. Requir-
ing a state to justify with a compelling interest any law dealing
with a particular subject merely because of a general belief,
however sincere or religious, that there should be no law is
surely approaching the forbidden logical extreme.3 4 For exam-
ple, a person may assert that his entire life reflects his religious
convictions and is a part of his religious mission. If accepted,
that assertion could require a state either to justify with a
compelling interest any law affecting that person or to exempt
him from that law. Such an extreme result cannot be tolerated,
even in the name of religious freedom. Thus, the ultimate solu-
tion in Hinton should not have rested upon general arguments
against any form of regulation; the analysis should have fo-
cused instead on the actual burdens imposed by these particu-
lar regulations. The fundamentalist schools, probably antici-
pating such an argument, did attempt to prove that the spe-
cific regulations discussed below were actual, significant bur-
dens on their free exercise of religion.
1. The Teacher Certification Requirement
The schools claimed that the teacher certification require-
ment interfered with their actual teaching in two ways: first,
that there were few teachers available who had a Bachelor's
degree, as required by the state, and who met the religious
standards of these schools; 35 and second, that the schools could
not afford to hire teachers with Bachelor's degrees."
The state characterized the first argument as a merely
sisters will be needed to convert and care for the hundred million non-
Catholics in the United States?'
1 See note 13 supra for a brief discussion of one problem that could be caused by
such an extreme position.
I Hinton, Brief for Plaintiffs at 28; Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 12 (quoting
testimony of Rev. Goodell of the Frankfort Baptist Tabernacle, in Hinton, transcript
vol. I, 26-28). These standards include a belief that the person will go to heaven when
he dies, a strong belief in separation of church and state, and abstinence from drinking,
smoking, using profanity, and following "the world's standards of dress and conduct."
Hinton, Brief for Defendant at 11-12 (quoting testimony of Rev. Goodell, in Hinton,
transcript vol. I, 16-17).
31 Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 12 (quoting testimony of Rev. Goodell, in
Hinton, transcript vol. I, 26-28).
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speculative "fear. . . which so far has not been borne out by
experience." 7 Without some evidence that the plaintiffs' fear
was justified, the court could not base its decision on such
speculation and apparently did not do so."
The second argument was a bit more persuasive. While the
Supreme Court has held that a purely financial burden will not
support a free exercise claim,"s in Hinton the claim was that the
financial burden was so severe as to be prohibitive; not only
would it cost the schools money to comply with the regulation,
it would cost them so much that they could not operate and
thus would not be able to exercise their religious beliefs. Surely
such a burden, if proven, would weigh heavily in a balancing
test.
The court accepted the financial argument, to a degree,
saying: "Compliance . would be financially impossible for
some of the [schools]." 4 Still, since compliance would not be
impossible for all the schools, a portion of the holding must
have been based upon the plaintiffs' general opposition to all
regulation of their teaching."
2. The Textbook Approval Requirement
The plaintiffs also claimed that the textbook approval re-
quirement interfered with their actual teaching because some
of the approved texts omitted materials which their religion
required them to teach, while others included material to
which they were religiously opposed." The state countered,
saying that the schools were not required to teach all material
contained in the texts and could cure omissions by using sup-
plemental texts, which would require no approval.43 More sig-
" Id. at 13.
n There is no mention in the court's opinion or in its 81 separate findings of fact
of a shortage of teachers.
" Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
"Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 6, at 2 (emphasis added).
'1 For a discussion of this general opposition, see notes 26-34 and accompanying
text supra.
"Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 60, at 8.
" Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 15. KRS § 156.445 (1971) requires approval of
basal texts only. The fact that objectionable material is in some of the required texts
is important, however, even if it is not taught, since the students would have ready
access to it. One possible, though certainly not perfect, solution would be for the
schools to "black out" objectionable material.
1978-79]
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nificantly, the textbook commission had a flexible policy of
adopting alternative texts not on the list, a policy of which
these schools had not attempted to take advantage." Thus, the
only burden the plaintiffs showed in Hinton, beyond their gen-
eral opposition to any regulation of textbooks, was that they
would have to submit their textbooks for approval, to go
through a process to have them approved. Certainly this small
burden should not weigh too heavily in any balancing test,
unless and until such texts have been submitted and rejected.
Such a burden is much less than the financial one claimed with
respect to teacher certification. Note that the burden there
could, conceivably, cause the demise of at least some of the
schools. Thus, if proven to exist, that burden is surely a great
one. On the other hand, the burden of merely submitting text-
books for approval is a light one, especially so in light of the
flexible policies of the state.
3. Curriculum Requirements
The fundamentalist schools, while agreeing to offer proof
that they were teaching all the basic subjects,' balked at the
state's imposition of curriculum requirements in the form of
"Carnegie Units."46 This constitutional challenge should not
have succeeded in Hinton because the required curriculum
plan in Kentucky leaves plenty of time for religious schools to
teach whatever they desire.47 However, separate classes in reli-
gion are not even taught in these schools, "rather religious
doctrines and examples are interwoven with all other sub-
" Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 14. A statute mandating that a satisfactory text
not be rejected solely because it contains elements of religion is scheduled to take effect
July 1, 1979. KRS § 156.445(2) (Supp. 1978). The officials involved appear willing to
implement the spirit of this statute immediately. Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 14-
15.
4" Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 33, at 5.
11 Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 16. The state requires that secondary schools
give each student 10 units of instruction in required courses. This translates to an
average of two and one half hours per day, if the student spends the traditional 4 years
in secondary school. The only requirement for non-secondary schools is that the basic
subjects be taught. Id. The schools have agreed to teach these basic subjects. Hinton,
Findings of Fact No. 33, at 5.
'47 Kentucky's curriculum requirements differ in this respect from those involved
in State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). The Ohio Supreme Court in Whisner
struck down a curriculum plan which allocated practically the entire school day to
secular subjects. Id. at 765. For an analysis of the case, see Note, supra note 6. See
note 46 supra for a discussion of Kentucky's curriculum requirments.
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jects."48 Since these plaintiffs claimed that their religious mis-
sion is teaching secular as well as religious subjects, any curric-
ulum plan could be said to interfere with that mission. Such
an argument goes too far toward making any regulation a bur-
den on religion. When the bulk of the school day is available
for the schools to teach what they wish and when religious
teachings can be interwoven with certain subjects that are re-
quired by the curriculum, the burden on religion seems mini-
mal.
The state pointed out that several fundamentalist
churches-Seventh Day Adventist, Disciples of Christ, and
Southern Baptist-and Catholics have been operating schools
completely within the teacher certification, curriculum, and
textbook requirements without being burdened. 9 Further, two
of the plaintiff schools had been approved without any notice-
able "interfer[ence] with their religious freedom."5 Although
the fact that most church schools can operate within these
requirements without feeling burdened does not inevitably lead
to the conclusion that all church schools can do so, this fact
should cause courts to be more skeptical when a burden is
alleged. The courts should require the schools to prove a spe-
cific, significant burden. In Hinton, that burden simply was
not proven.
B. The State's Interest in Education
If the party advancing a free exercise claim proves a signif-
icant burden, the Sherbert/Yoder test requires a state to justify
its law by showing a compelling state interest.€5 Yoder held that
"only those interests of the highest order and those not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exer-
cise of religion."52 Even the most staunch advocates of parental
rights and freedom of religion agree that, at some point, the
state may circumvent the parents in order to protect the chil-
" Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 16, at 3. Even accepting the plaintiffs' argument
that teaching secular subjects is also a part of their exercise of religion, the Kentucky
curriculum requirements. surely do not pose a significant burden, particularly since
these schools have agreed to teach the basic subjects.
" Hinton, Brief for Defendant at 17-18; Hinton, Closing Arguments at 44 (Combs
for Defendant).
Hinton, Closing Arguments at 44 (Combs for Defendant).
" See text accompanying note 19 supra for this balancing test.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
1978-79]
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dren. "5 The Yoder Court accepted the proposition that the state
has an important interest in "some degree of education" to
prepare children both to participate in our political system and
to be self-supporting members of society. "4
Earlier cases, while recognizing the rights of parents to
send their children to private schools, have consistently ac-
cepted a state's right to regulate those schools reasonably. s
The fundamentalist schools in Hinton argued that the specific
regulations did not advance any compelling interest because
the state had not proven any relationship between the regula-
tions and the goal of a quality education. 6
While the state failed to prove that these regulations en-
sure quality education, the reason is obvious: such a showing
is impossible. As one scholar discovered in analyzing attempts
to evaluate teaching materials, "[I]t is not presently possible
to measure improvement in learning."5 7 If "quality education"
is defined as something more than mere "learning" the prob-
lem increases in complexity. And if "teacher competence" is
defined as the ability to educate children, the difficulty in mea-
suring the quality of a teacher is equally clear.-8 If the state is
required to prove with empirical evidence that its regulations
advance the compelling interest of education, it simply cannot
do so.
Still, there are some things that can logically be assumed
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 1230. The recent tragedy at Jonestown,
Guyana, where members of a religious sect poisoned their children and then them-
selves, indicates the need for state intervention at some point. The question is: When
is that point reached?
" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). For an analysis of the state's
interest in education, see Riga, supra note 10, at 460.
uSee, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Even in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970), a case relied upon heavily by the Hinton plaintiffs in
their establishment clause claim, the Court acknowledged that "[a] State always has
a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to
operate." Id. at 613.
m Hinton, Brief for Plaintiff at 27-31. The court agreed: "[Tihe evidence taken
in this case fails to demonstrate more than a scintilla of 'colorable state interest'
subserved by [these regulations]." Hinton at 1.
57 Jacobs, Quality Control for Instruction Materials, 12 HARv. J. LEois. 511, 550
(1975).
" Teachers are beginning to challenge certification requirements as being unre-
lated to teaching ability. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Nix, 407 F.Supp. 1102
(N.D.Ga. 1976); United States v. North Carolina, 400 F.Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
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without empirical evidence. 59 It can be assumed that a text-
book approved as thoroughly covering an important subject
will be a better teaching aid than no textbook, or one which
does not thoroughly cover the material. It can also be assumed
that a teacher with a college degree will in almost all cases be
a better teacher than one with little or no education. The
teacher with a college degree, has, at the very least, demon-
strated the mastery of certain basic skills."
So despite the court's finding that "there is no empirical,
demonstrable, or reasonable casual connection . . .between
the State's requirements and. . . the guaranteeing of quality
education,"'" there is a logical connection. Coupled with the
state's interest in education and the difficulty in measuring
education, this logical connection should weigh heavily in the
balance. Saying that a state must prove that a regulation is
necessary to advance a compelling interest is a fine theory but,
under these particular facts, difficult to apply. The regulation
may be imperfect, but without it the state has no assurance
whatsoever that its interest is being protected. 62 Thus, it is the
only means to ensure a compelling governmental interest.
11. STANDARDIZED TESTS As AN ALTERNATIVE To REGULATIONS
The plaintiffs in Hinton argued successfully that the use
of standardized tests sufficiently satisfies the state's interest in
education, that the state should "taste the pudding. . . with-
out fussing so much about the recipe." 3 This reasoning ignores
a growing body of evidence against the value of such tests.64
U Surely church leaders would agree whole-heartedly.
0 Undoubtedly, more correlation would exist if math teachers were required to
have math degrees, history teachers to have history degrees, etc., but that would be
more of a burden on private schools. The state has not chosen to go that far, although
schools could do so voluntarily.
" Hinton, Findings of Fact No. 70, at 10.
"See notes 63-72 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the plaintiffs'
suggested alternative protection.
"3 Hinton, Brief for Defendant at 20 (quoting Dr. Erickson, witness for the plain-
tiffs). The court agreed. Hinton at 2.
" See, e.g., Report of the NEA Task Force on Testing, 1975, in STANDARDIZED
TzImrG IssuEs: TEACHNG PERSPCnvas 81 (1977) (republished on microfiche by Educ.
Research Info. Center [hereinafter cited as ERIC], catalog no. ED 146 233).
"Throughout its study the Task Force has been especially impressed with the depth
of feeling and the weight of evidence against group standardized tests as reliable/valid
measures of achievement and intelligence." Id. at 83.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Further, it ignores the state's protest that standardized'tests
could only "be given after the fact, and low scores might reflect
needless, and possibly irreparable educational failure. 65
Standardized tests do not measure education. They measure
"little more than the ability to recall facts, define words, and
do routine calculations. . ., mak[ing] almost no provision for
evaluating a student's ability to estimate or measure real
things-important skills needed for functioning as workers and
citizens." 6 Since the Yoder Court accepted the proposition
that the state has an interest in education because of the need
for "workers and citizens,"67 it should be clear that standard-
ized tests cannot satisfy the state's interest. While it may be
argued that teacher certification, approved textbooks, and a
required curriculum do not ensure functioning "workers and
citizens," the logical connection between such state require-
ments and the state purpose-functioning "workers and citi-
zens"-indicates that the state's requirements are more nearly
related to the state purpose than is an achievement test.
Even if the standardized tests did measure important
skills, they still would not be a valid indicator of a school's
performance in teaching since "as much as 80 percent of the
variation in pupil achievement across schools (equal to a
correlation of about +.90) can be accounted for by [socio-
economic] factors. 68 Thus, the make-up of the student body
plays a much larger role in test scores than the performance of
the school. Further, the use of standardized tests as a means
of accrediting private schools provides an inherent incentive for
those schools to discriminate in admissions against those who
traditionally do poorly on such tests-the poor and the cultural
minorities.69
1 Hinton, Brief for Defendants at 21.
45 McKenna, What's Wrong With Standardized Testing? in STANlDARDm TEST-
ING ISSUES: TEACHING PERSPECTivEs 7, 8 (1977) (republished on microfiche by ERIC,
catalog no. ED 146 233).
o, See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra for a discussion of Yoder.
" Soar & Soar, Problems in Using Pupil Outcomes For Teacher Evaluation, in
STANDARDIZED TESTING ISSUES: TEACHING PERSPECVnES 53, 53 (1977) (republished on
microfiche by ERIC, catalog no. ED 146 233).
1, The fact that these groups do poorly on standardized tests is virtually undis-
puted. See, e.g., McClung, ,Competency Testing: Potential For Discrimination, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE L. REV. 439 (1977); Mercer, Sociocultural Factors in the Education of
Black and Chicano Children, in STANDARDIZED TESTING ISSUES: TEACHERS PERSPUM
67 (1977) (republished on microfiche by ERIC, catalog no. ED 146 233); Pascale, The
Impossible Dream: A Culture-Free Test, (1971) (republished on microfiche by ERIC,
catalog no. ED 054 217).
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Perhaps the greatest weakness of the tests, even if they
could measure both important skills and the school's perform-
ance, is that they can still only be used after the fact. While
the court in Hinton gave no guidance as to what the state may
do if students do not perform satisfactorily on the tests, surely
no one would argue that the state should be allowed to close
the school immediately. Any meaningful evaluation would take
time. One writer has suggested that, due to cultural influences
in the tests, a reliable measure of a teacher's performance (or,
of course, that of a school) would require testing classes over a
twenty-year period. 0 The state must have some assurance that
its interest is being protected in the meantime.
Many reservations have been voiced about the use of
standardized tests and the National Education Association
(NEA) has advocated abolition of their use altogether.7' The
court in Hinton turned to these tests in a noble effort to strike
a balance between free exercise and the state's interest in edu-
cation. That balance is out of kilter, however. "H.L. Mencken
once commented, 'There's always a well-known solution to
every human problem- neat, plausible, and wrong.' The use
of pupil achievement tests as a way of evaluating the teacher,
the school, or the school system embodies this misleading sim-
plicity. ' 7
CONCLUSION
The state in Hinton produced evidence at trial that some
schools have been established "by parents and other persons
with no known previous educational background or experi-
ence. '' 3 Without the power to mandate minimum standards for
these schools, the state has no protection of its important and
valid interest in ensuring the opportunity for quality education
for all its children. Standardized tests are not an acceptable
substitute. Hinton, therefore, should be reversed.
Michael D. Baker
, Soar & Soar, supra note 68.
N' EA Resolution on tandardized Tests 76-65 in STMDAMOZ TEsarG IssUEs:
TEAcHER PEmsPwrvs 64, 64 (1977) (republished on microfiche by ERIC, catalog no.
ED 146 233).
Soar & Soar, supra note 68, at 53.
" Hinton, Brief for Defendant at 13.
"In a procedure bypassing the Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court
will hear the Hinton appeal sub nom. Kentucky State Board for Secondary and Ele-
mentary Education v. Rudasill, No. 78-SC-642-T (Ky. Jan. 8, 1979).
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